Mapping the Mind Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture
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Mapping the Mind Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture
What is the nature of human thought? A long dominant view holds that the mind is a general problem-solving device that approaches all questions in much the same way. Chomsky’s theory of language, which revolutionized linguistics, challenged this claim, contending that children are primed to acquire some skills, such as language, in a manner largely independent of their ability to solve other sorts of apparently similar mental problems. In recent years, researchers in anthropology, psychology, linguistics and neuroscience have examined whether other mental skills are similarly independent. Many have concluded that much of human thought is “domain-specific.” Thus, the mind is better viewed as a collection of cognitive abilities specialized to handle specific tasks than as a general problem solver. Mapping the Mind introduces a general audience to a domain-specificity perspective, by compiling a collection of essays exploring how several of these cognitive abilities are organized. This volume is appropriate as a reader for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses in cultural psychology, psychological anthropology, developmental and cognitive psychology.
User Ratings and Reviews
5 Stars Excellent introduction to central topic in modern cog sci
While certainly putting forth a controversial view of cognition, this book includes contributions by many of the scientists in the forefront of the field, and provides a broad overview of thinking in this area. Great for students as well as experts in the field.
4 Stars Needs more scientific support but a helpful book
Is the human brain an entity that makes use of a general collection of reasoning processes that can be used to solve problems no matter what domain or context these problems appear? Or does the human brain make use of cognitive processes that work only in specific domains? The latter alternative is called `domain specificity’ and is held to be the correct one throughout this book. The articles in the book argue for the hypothesis of domain specificity mostly from a philosophical point of view, and not a scientific one. The articles though do grant a large degree of insight into the current thinking on domain specificity. Via measurements and laboratory experiments, current research in neuroscience is beginning to shed more light on whether the brain is an “all-purpose” problem solver or a collection of independent modules geared toward specific tasks. All of the articles in the book are interesting, but only a few will be reviewed here due to reasons of space.
The first article of the book, entitled “Toward a topography of mind: An introduction to domain specificity,” introduces the problem of domain specificity and how it arose historically. It is very tricky to define what a domain actually is, but the authors of this article take it up in some detail. They emphasize the Chomsky theory of natural language grammar as being one of the first most important examples of a domain-specific perspective. If the mind is modular, as Chomsky and the authors in this book assert, then damage to one module should not affect the cognitive abilities of another module. There are indications from experimental neuroscience that this is the case for abilities such as language, music, and mathematics for example. The authors mention some of this evidence in this article. Interestingly though, they believe that theories are domain specific. They argue for example, that a theory of biology cannot be applied to physics. However this is only partly true. For example, molecular biology can be interpreted completely in terms of physics. There are many other examples of theories designed for specific domains that work in others. In addition, the authors assert that theory construction is not necessary for “getting around the world.” This may be true in a certain weak sense, but finding a cure for cancer or “getting around” or traveling to other worlds requires highly sophisticated theories. The authors do however distinguish between `scientific’ theories and commonsense or `folk’ theories, the latter of which are needed in everyday life. They discuss some examples in the article that emphasize their assertion that “theoretical” beliefs are important in organizing input data. The authors also address the question of what a domain really is, noting at the same time that an explicit definition does not exist. They therefore rely on examples of domains, and characterize it as a body of knowledge that serves to identify and interpret phenomena sharing certain properties.
In the second article of the book, entitled “The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representations,” the author attempts to defend the view that thought processes themselves are also modular, and to explain his ideas on second topic in the title. The author believes that the modularity of thought is in no way incompatible with the diversity of human cultures, and much of the article is devoted to explaining why he thinks this is true. To this end, the author wants to distinguish between the `actual’ domain of a conceptual module and the `proper’ domain. The actual domain is the totality of information in the environment that satisfies the input conditions of the module. The `proper’ domain is the information that it is the module’s biological function to process. The module will process information in its actual domain, regardless of whether or not this information is contained in its proper domain. This distinction the author believes will allow him to explain the wide variation in human cultures, for the actual domains have become larger than the proper domains. This allows the organization of vast amounts of information, and allows the distinguishing of what he calls `cultural domains’ of modules. For the author, an explanation of culture involves explaining why some representations become more widely distributed than others. This explanation he calls the `epidemiology of representations’, wherein information in human communities is thought of as competing for private and public space and time. Interestingly, the transmission of cultural information in his view induces in the actual domain of any module a proliferation of `parasitic’ information that acts like the proper domain of this module. He quotes music as being an example of this, but he is careful to point out that he has not supported his case in this regard by rigorous scientific evidence.
In order to fit in to the evolutionary paradigm of modern science, the authors of the fourth article in the book, entitled “Origins of domain specificity: The evolution of functional organization”, attempt to show how modules can be viewed as evolved adaptations. The authors emphasize very strongly the need for natural selection in explaining the existence of complex functional design, and that the evolved design of organisms is the result of events in the past and happened without anticipation of the present. Successful cognitive mechanisms of the present are the result of what has happened in the past. Domain-general mechanisms, the authors argue at length, cannot be reconciled with evolutionary biology. Generality is achieved at the price of effectiveness, and domain-specific mechanisms that are able to utilize the stable features of recurring situations will outperform general mechanisms that don’t utilize these features. There are no domain-general criteria for success/failure that correlate with fitness. In addition, domain-general criteria are limited to what can be derived from perceptual information, and are subject to combinatorial explosion.
